Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Augustine, Anselm and Stephen Read

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92 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I must exist in order to be mistaken, so that even if I am mistaken, I can't be wrong about my own existence [Augustine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The contact of spirit and body is utterly amazing, and incomprehensible [Augustine]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon]
Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
All things are in the present time to God [Augustine]
If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine]
If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]